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LACK OF DUE PROCESS IN VIRGINIA CONTEMPT
PROCEEDING FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
ORDER FOR SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
At common law a husband had a legal duty' to support his wife
and children.' Today in Virginia failure to support one's family is not
simply a violation of a legal duty, it is a criminal act,8 carrying a pen-
alty of up to twelve months at hard labor for the delinquent husband.4
The wife, however, without resorting to this criminal action, can ef-
fectuate the same result in a civil proceeding before a divorce court.5
Generally, in a proceeding for divorce in Virginia, the wife includes
in her petition a prayer for support and alimony.' The court issues the
requested order 7 and retains jurisdiction over the parties.8 Upon the
husband's failure to comply with the court order, the court is given the
I The language "legal duty" used for nonsupport actions connotes a higher de-
gree of obligation than the phrase "legal obligation". See Noyes v. Hubbard, 64 Vt. 302,
23 A. 727 (1892). This is one of the early legal fictions surrounding alimony and sup-
port and it allowed the court to imprison the husband for his failure to comply with
a duty rather than his non-payment of a debt.
2 Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 339, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940).
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1968). Nonsupport is like any other criminal
proceeding in that anyone may institute the prosecution. Institution is usually by the
wife, but not limited to her. After the petition is filed by the interested party, the
state takes over the prosecution. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-64 (1960).
4 VA. COnE ANN. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
5 The divorce court has the power to include in its decree for divorce an order for
support and alimony. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1968). If a previous non-
support verdict under § 20-61 has been rendered against the present defendant, such
verdict shall be vacated upon the inclusion in the divorce decree of an order for
support and alimony. VA. CODE ArN. § 20-79 (a) (1960). The language of S 20-79(a)
indicates that the existence of the two "verdicts" would be double jeopardy. This clearly
shows the equality of the two results. The divorce court also has the power to punish
under 5 20-61 upon conviction of contempt of the court's support order. VA. CODE ANN.
5 20-115 (1960).
6Divorce suits are instituted just as any other suit in equity-by bill of complaint.
VA. CODE ANN. 1 20-99 (Cum. Supp. 1968). However, it should be noted that the
specific request for alimony is not necessary. The court can award alimony under
its general power granted in VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (1960).
7 VA. CODE AN. § 20-107 (1960).
8ld. at § 20-108. See Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S.E. 879 (1930) (divorce a
mense et tboro); Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E.2d 893 (1940), (divorce a vinculo).
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power9 to "convict" 10 him of contempt and punish him accordingly,"
or sentence him to hard labor under the nonsupport statute,' 2 but in no
event shall the imprisonment exceed twelve months.13 It is the purpose
of this comment to show the inherently criminal nature and the result-
ing failure of due process of this Virginia divorce procedure where
the court has included an order for support and alimony.
Clearly the divorce court's use of the contempt conviction to punish
the husband has criminal results.' 4 But to determine the inherently crim-
inal nature of the Virginia divorce proceeding as is relevant to due
process, it is essential to study the logic behind several recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States, requiring procedural safe-
guards in juvenile proceedings, 15 and the right to a jury trial for serious
misdemeanors' and criminal contempts.17 In each of these decisions,
0 VA. ConE ANN. § 20-113 (Cum. Supp. 1968) provides: "The court, when it finds the
respondent has failed to perform the order of the court concerning the support of
the child or payment of alimony ... may proceed to deal with the respondent as pro-
vided in ... § 20-115... ." VA. Cone AzNN. § 20-115 (1960) provides: "(Ulpon convic-
tion of contempt of court in failing or refusing to comply with any order or decree
for support, maintenance and alimony ...."
'0 VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-115 (1960). The word "convicted" connotes a criminal prose-
cution.
"1VA. CODE, Am-. H 18.1-292 to 18.1-295 (1960). Note that § 18.1-293 limits the punish-
ment that can be issued by courts not of record to ten days. Thus a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court must proceed under § 20-61 in order for a twelve-month sen-
tence to be legal.
12 VA. CODE _A_. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1968). See note 13 infra.
13 VA. COD ANN. § 20-115 (1960) provides: ". . . Upon conviction of any party
for contempt of court in failing or refusing to comply with any order or decree for
support, maintenance or alimony, the court may commit and sentence such party to a
work house, city farm or work squad, or the state convict road force, at hard labor,
as provided for in § 20-61 and 20-62, for a fixed or indeterminate period or until the
further order of the court, in no event however for more than twelve months...
(emphasis added).
14The language used in 3 20-115, "upon conviction of any party for contempt of
court in failing or refusing to comply with an order or decree . . .," is clearly the
language of the criminal contempt statute [§ 18.1-292(5)]. If the court sentences the
husband under the contempt statute, the punishment is clearly criminal in that it is
"to vindicate the dignity of the court." Local 333B, United Marine Div. v. Com., 193
Va. 773, 71 SE. 2d 159 (1952).
If the court, instead of sentencing the husband to prison, may under § 20-115
sentence him to hard labor under 3 20-61 (the criminal nonsupport statute), the punish-
ment is also criminal.
15 See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
'7 See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 US. 216 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.s. 194 (1968).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the Supreme Court looked not at the type of proceeding instituted,
but at the possible term of commitment to determine the procedural
rights to which the defendant was entitled."8 In essence, the Supreme
Court refused to find a justification for procedural laxity in statutory 9
and socio-legal 0 labels. Applying this "term of commitment" test to
the Virginia divorce proceedings, it becomes obvious that the proceed-
ing is of such a fundamentally criminal nature as to require the ap-
propriate due process guarantees afforded in a criminal contempt prose-
21.cution.
In analyzing numerous Virginia divorce cases, it becomes a matter of
conjecture as to whether the defendant is being punished civilly or
criminally.22 It appears that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
18 The procedural safeguards outlined in Gault are only effective when the juvenile
has a possibility of commitment. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Duncan, the court
noted that a defendant was entitled to a jury trial in his prosecution for a misde-
meanor, where the possible term of commitment was two years. Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Dyke, the court said that for criminal contempt, where there
is a possibility of being sentenced for a term of more than six months, a jury trial
is required. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968). Bloom varies slightly
from Dyke in that Dyke involved contempt under a statute which had a fixed maxi-
mum sentence, whereas in Bloom there was no maximum. The court in Bloom said
that if the defendant is actually sentenced to more than six months in jail, he is
entitled to a jury trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The rationale behind
all of these decisions is that when a human being may have his freedom restricted,
he is entitled to certain procedural safeguards.
19 The term "misdemeanor" in Duncan was meaningless because the defendant was
sentenced to two years in jail.
20 The term parens patriae should not serve to deprive a juvenile of his fundamental
constitutional rights.
21 (A) Reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard (only applies to contempt
not in face of the court). Cook v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
(B) Confrontation of witnesses and right to be represented by counsel. In Re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
(C) Presumption of innocence. United States v. Fleischman, 399 U.S. 349, 363 (1950).
(D) Right to envoke the privilege against self incrimination. Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,444 (1911).
(E) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42,
66 (1924).
(F) Right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. In Re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 51-52
(1943).
(G) Right to a trial by jury where there is a possibility of a maximum sentence in
excess of six months. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
Although the Virginia contempt statute sets out no maximum punishment, the
punishment for contempt of an alimony decree is limited in § 20-115 to a maximum
of twelve months, which satisfies the Dyke requirement.
22"The imprisonment is not ordered simply to enforce the payment of the money,
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has placed primary emphasis on the traditional criminal contempt power
of equity to punish for "disobedience of the court order," 23 but the
court never fails to add that in sentencing the husband, the divorce
court is enforcing a legal right between the parties,24 which is the tradi-
tional function of civil contempt.25 This two-pronged argument, so
deeply imbedded in Virginia case law, 26 has its foundation in historical
precedent and stare decisis rather than sound judicial logic.
The Virginia General Assembly by statute has set out the elements
of criminal contempt, giving the courts summary power of enforce-
ment.2 7 Clearly the "conviction of contempt of court in failing or re-
fusing to comply with any order or decree for support, maintenance
and alimony" is an element under the Virginia criminal contempt stat-
ute.2s Therefore, under no circumstances should the husband's punish-
ment for failure to obey the support decree be considered civil con-
tempt.
The second prong of the argument so often used by the Virginia
but to punish for the wilful disobedience of a proper order of a court of competent
jurisdiction." West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 699, 101 S.E. 876, 877 (1920). Clearly this is
criminal contempt. See VA. CODE ANrw. § 18.1-292 (1960).
In a later case the court used the above language in answer to defendant's defense
of imprisonment for a debt. Edden v. Edden, 188 Va. 511, 516, 50 S.E. 2d 397, 400
(1948). Then later in the same opinion the court answered the defendant's defense
of the statute of limitations on misdemeanors as follows: "Clearly the statute has no
application to the present proceeding, for it is not a criminal prosecution. . . . The
purpose of the present proceeding is to enforce the rights of a private party, the
appellee wife, and is, therefore a civil and not a criminal contempt proceeding." Id.
at 523, 50 S.E. 2d at 403. Clearly West is criminal contempt. How can a court
in one paragraph say a proceeding is criminal, and in the next paragraph say it is to
enforce the rights of the parties-that is, civil contempt?
In another case the Virginia court offered an interesting compromise by saying:
"While the proceedings for contempt is [sic] quasi criminal, and the guilt of the
defendant must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt... "' Branch v. Branch, 144 Va.
244, 249, 132 S.E. 303, 305 (1926).
See also Lindsey v. Lindsey, 158 Va. 647, 652, 164 S.E. 551, 553 (1932); Eaton v.
Davis, 176 Va. 330, 338, 10 S.E. 2d 893, 897 (1940).
23 This is by way of construing the following language from the leading Virginia
case on point: "The imprisonment is ... to punish for the willful disobedience of a
proper order of a court of competent jurisdiction." West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 699,
101 S.E. 876, 877 (1920). See also VA. CoDz Azw. § 18.1-292 (5) (1960).24 See cases cited note 22 supra.
2zSee Local 333B, United Marine Div. v. Com, 193 Va. 773, 71 S.E. 2d 159 (1952).
2 6 See cases cited note 21 supra.
2 T VA. CoDn Amx. § 18.1-292 (5) (1960).
28Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 20-115 (1960) and the language of West, "... to
punish for the wilful disobedience of a proper order 'of a court . . :" witb VA.
CoDE ANm. § 18.1-292 (5) (1960).
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divorce courts in justifying their sentencing procedure is that in send-
ing the husband -to jail, they are merely enforcing the rights of the
party litigants. 9 To strengthen this argument, the Virginia courts main-
tain that the husband has a legal duty to support his family, and it is
within the power of the divorce courts to enforce this duty by con-
tempt proceedings ° Unfortunately, this argument is no longer tenable.
Failure to support one's family in Virginia today is a crime;3' it is no
longer merely a legal duty."2 Therefore, the divorce courts are not
merely enforcing the rights of the party litigants; they are punishing
the husband for a crime against the state, as well as coercing him into
paying support money. The legal duty owed by the husband carries
criminal sanctions; therefore, the duty is not simply one of civil lia-
bility, but by statute has become a form of criminal responsibility.33
What this means to the husband who fails to support his family is
that he can be sentenced up to twelve months at hard labor in a
"purely" civil proceeding, without rights constitutionally guaranteed
him in the ordinary criminal contempt prosecution.34
To rectify this situation, the divorce court has an alternative-to give
the husband the applicable constitutional guarantee of due process
that he would be entitled to in a criminal contempt prosecution, 35 or to
keep the proceeding entirely civil by imprisoning him until he obeys
the decree."6 In the latter, by giving him the keys to his own cell.'
29 See cases cited note 22 supra.
30 ld.
31 VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
32 See Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E. 2d 893 (1940). Compare Eaton with
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
33 To make a comparison between assault and battery and a nonsupport proceeding
may at first appear ridiculous, but it is not. If X strikes Y, he is subject to a criminal
prosecution as well as civil liability. Yet if Y proceeds against X in tort for battery
and is given a judgment against X, X will not be imprisoned for his failure to pay.
On the other hand, if H and W are husband and wife, and W institutes a divorce
proceeding against H and receives a decree or order for support, H can be sentenced
to twelve months in jail or at hard labor for failure to pay the ordered support.
34 See cases cited note 21 supra.
35 Id.
36 A provisional sentence makes the contempt civil. In Re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461
(8th Cir. 1902). Nevitt was upheld in Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
Sbillitani added that the provisional sentence alone makes the contempt civil, but
a condition precedent to the court's ability to hold the defendant in prison is that
there must be in existence during the imprisonment a method by which the con-
temnor may purge himself.,
-It should be noted that a recent California case considered the possible application
of Duncan, Dyke and Bloom to civil contempt. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co.
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the divorce court can properly sentence for civil contempt and still
maintain respect for its decrees.
G. H. M. III
v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). The court held that they
were not applicable because civil contempt is a "petty offense" not requiring a jury
trial within the meaning of Duncan, Dyke and Bloom. Id. at 179. California, however,
has a contempt statute, like Virginia's, set out in its Code of Civil Procedure, not its
Penal Code.
87See In Re Nevitt, 117 F. 448 (8th Cir. 1902); Shillanti v. United States, 384
U.S. 364 (1965).
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